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In the Martin and Franklin cases, application of the sec-
tion to businesses not specifically mentioned in other sec-
tions of the ordinance was upheld. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22697. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1953.] 
AI_jlj'RED K. WEISS et al., Appellants, v. STATE BOARD 
OF EQUALIZATION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Intoxicating Liquors-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-In exer-
cising power which State Board of Equalization has under 
Const., art. XX, § 22, to deny, in its discretion, "any specific 
liquor license if it shall determine for good cause that the 
granting ... of such license would be contrary to public 
welfare or morals," the board performs a quasi judicial func-
tion similar to local administrative agencies. 
[2] Licenses-Application.-Under appropriate circumstances, the 
same rules apply to determination of an application for a 
license as those for its revocation. 
[3] Intoxicating Liquors- Licenses- Discretion of Board.-The 
discretion of the State Board of Equalization to deny or revoke 
a liquor license is not absolute but must be exercised in ac-
cordance with the law, and the provision that it may revoke or 
deny a license "for good cause" necessarily implies that its de-
cision should be based on sufficient evidence and that it should 
not act arbitrarily in determining what is contrary to public 
welfare or morals. 
[4] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-While the State Board of 
Equalization may refuse an on-sale liquor license if the prem-
ises are in the immediate vicinity of a school (Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, § 13), the absence of such a provision 
or regulation by the board as to off-sale licenses does not 
preclude it from making proximity of the premises to a school 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 25 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Intoxicating Liquors, § 121. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-7] Intoxicating Liquors, § 9.4; [2] 
Licenses, § 32. 
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an adequate basis for denying an off~Rale lirlense as being 
inimical to public morals and welfare. 
[5] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-It is not unreasonable 
for the State Board of Equalization to decide that public 
welfare and morals would be jeopardized by the granting of 
an off-sale liquor license within 80 feet of some of the build-
ings on a school ground. 
16] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-Denial of an application 
for an off-sale license to sell beer and wine at a store conduct-
ing a grocery and delicatessen business across the street from 
high school grounds is not arbitrary because there are other 
liquor licensees operating in the vicinity of the school, where 
all of them, except a drugstore, are at such a distance from 
the school that it cannot be said the board acted arbitrarily, 
and where, in any event, the mere fact that the board may 
have erroneously granted licenses to be used near the school 
in the past does not make it mandatory for the board to con-
tinue its error and grant any subsequent application. 
[7] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-Denial of an application 
for an off-sale license to sell beer and wine at a store across 
the street from high school grounds is not arbitrary because 
the neighborhood is predominantly Jewish and applicants in-
tend to sell wine to customers of the Jewish faith for sacra-
mental purposes, especially where there is no showing that 
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained else-
where. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. .B'rank G. Swain, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel State Board of Equal-
ization to issue an off-sale liquor license. Judgment denying 
writ affirmed. 
Riedman & Silverberg and Milton H. Silverberg for Ap-
pellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Howard S. 
Goldin, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs brought mandamus proceedings in 
the superior court to review the refusal of defendant, State 
Board of Equalization, to issue them an off-sale beer and 
wine license at their premises and to compel the issuance of 
such a license. 'rhe court gave judgment for the board and 
plaintiffs appeal. 
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Plaintiffs filed their application with the board for an off-
sale beer and wine license (a license to sell those beverages 
to be consumed elsewhere than on the premises) at their 
premises where they conducted a grocery and delicatessen 
business. .After a hearing the board denied the application 
on the grounds that the issuance of the license would be con-
trary to the ''public welfare and morals'' because of the 
proximity of the premises to a school. 
According to the evidence before the board, the area con-
cerned is in l1os Angeles. The school is located in the block 
bordered on the south by Rosewood .A venue, on the west by 
Fairfax A venue, and on the north by Melrose A venue-an 
80-foot street running east and west parallel to Rosewood and 
a block north therefrom. The school grounds are enclosed by 
a fence, the gates of which are kept locked most of the time. 
Plaintiffs' premises for which the license is sought are west 
across Fairfax, an 80-foot street, and on the corner of Fairfax 
and Rosewood. The area on the west side of Fairfax, both 
north and south from Rosewood, and on the east side of Fair-
fax south from Rosewood, is a business district. The balance 
of the area in the vicinity is residental. The school is a high 
school. The portion along Rosewood is an athletic field with 
the exception of buildings on the corner of Fairfax and Rose-
wood across Fairfax from plaintiffs' premises. Those build-
ings are used for R.O.T.C. The main buildings of the school 
are on Fairfax south of Melrose. There are gates along the 
Fairfax and Rosewood sides of the school but they are kept 
locked most of the time. There are other premises in the 
vicinity having liquor licenses. 'l'here are five on the west side 
of Fairfax in the block south of Rosewood and one on the east 
side of "B'airfax about three-fourths of a block south of Rose-
wood. North across Melrose and at the corner of Melrose and 
Fairfax is a drugstore which has an off-sale license. That 
place is 80 feet from the northwest corner of the school prop-
erty as Melrose is 80 feet wide and plaintiffs' premises are 
80 feet from the southwest corner of the school property. It 
does not appear when any of the licenses were issued, with 
reference to the existence of the school or otherwise. Nor does 
it appear what the distance is between the licensed drugstore 
and any school buildings as distinguished from school grounds. 
'l'he licenses on Fairfax A venue are all farther away from the 
school than plaintiffs' premises. 
Plaintiffs contend that the action of the board in denying 
them a license is arbitrary and unreasonable and they particu-
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larly point to the other licenses now outstanding on premises 
as near as or not much farther from the school. 
'l'he board has the power ''in its discretion, to deny . . . any 
specific liquor license if it shall determine for good cause that 
the granting . . . of such license would be contrary to public 
welfare or morals." (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22.) [l] In 
exercising that po·wer it performs a quasi judicial function 
similar to local administrative agencies. (Covert v. State 
Board of EqualizaNon, 29 Cal.2d 125 [173 P.2d 545] ; Reyn-
olds v. State Board of Eqttalization, 29 Cal.2d 137 [173 P.2d 
551, 174 P.2d 4] ; Stowmen v. Reilly, 37 Cal.2d 713 [234 P.2d 
969].) [2] Under appropriate circumstances, such as we 
have here, the same rules apply to the determination of an 
application for a license as those for the revoeation of a license. 
(Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260 [246 P.2d 656]; 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, § 39; Stats. 1935, p. 1123, 
as amended.) [3] In making· its decision "The board's dis-
cretion ... however, is not absolute but must be exercised 
in accordance with the law, and the provision that it may 
revoke [or deny] a licepse 'for good cause' necessarily implies 
that its decisions should be based on sufficient evidence and 
that it should not act arbitrarily in determining what is con-
trary to public welfare or morals." (Stournen v. Reilly, 
snpra, 37 Cal.2d 713, 717.) 
[4] Applying those rules to this case, it is pertinent to 
observe that ·while the board may refuse an on-sale license if 
the premises are in the immediate vicinity of a school (Alco-
holic Beverage Control Act, supra, § 13) there is no such pro-
vision or regulation by the board as to off-sale licenses. Never-
theless, proximity of the licensed premises to a school may 
supply an adequate basis for denial of a license as being 
inimical to public morals and welfare. (See Altadena Com-
rmmt:ty Church v. State Board of Eqtwlization, 109 Cal.App.2d 
99 [240 P.2d 322] ; State v. City of Racine, 220 Wis. 490 
[264 N.W. 490]; Ex parte Velasco, (Tex.Civ.App.) 225 S.W. 
2d 921; Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150 [78 N.E. 52].) 
The question is, therefore, whether the board acted arbi-
trarily in denying the application for the license on the ground 
of the proximity of the premises to the school. No question is 
raised as to the personal qualifications of the applicants. 
[5] \Ve cannot say, however, that it was unreasonable for 
the board to decide that public welfare and morals would be 
jeopardized by the granting of an off-sale license at premises 
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within 80 feet of some of the buildings on a school ground. As 
has been seen, a liquor license may be refused when the 
premises, where it is to be used, are in the vicinity of a school. 
\Vhile there may not be as much probability that an off-sale 
license in such a place would be as detrimental as an on-sale 
license, yet we believe a reasonable person could conclude that 
the sale of any liquor on such premises would adversely affect 
the public welfare and morals. 
"~ [6] Plaintiffs argue, however, that assuming the foregoing 
is true, the action of the board was arbitrary because there 
are other liquor licensees operating in the vicinity of the 
school. All of them, except the drugstore at the northeast 
corner of Fairfax and Melrose, are at such a distance from 
the school that we cannot say the board acted arbitrarily. It 
should be noted also that as to the drugstore, while it is 
within 80 feet of a corner of the school grounds, it does not 
appear whether there were any buildings near that corner, 
and as to all of the licensees, it does not appear when those 
licenses were granted with reference to the establishment of 
the school. 
Aside from these factors, plaintiffs' argument comes down 
to the contention that because the board may have erroneously 
granted licenses to be used near the school in the past it must 
continue its error and grant plaintiffs' application. That 
problem has been discussed: "Not only does due process 
permit omission of reasoned administrative opinions but it 
probably also perwjts substantial deviation from the principle 
of stare de~;Like courts, agencies may overrule prior 
dec1sioiis~0r practices and may initiate new policy or law 
through adjudication. Perhaps the best authority for this 
observation is FCC v. WOKO [329 U.S. 223 (67 S.Ct. 213, 
91 L.Ed. 204) .] The Commission denied renewal of a broad-
casting license because of misrepresentations made by the 
licensee concerning ownership of its capital stock. Before the 
rf'Viewing courts one of the principal arguments was that 
nomparable deceptions by other licensees had not been dealt 
with so severely. A unanimous Supreme Court easily rejected 
this argument : 'The mild measures to others and the appar-
ently unannounced change of policy are considerations appro-
priate for the Commission in determining whether its action 
in this case is too drastic, but we cannot say that the Commis-
sion is bound by anything that appears before us to deal with 
all cases at all times as it has dealt with some that seem com-
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parable.' In rejecting a similar arg·ument that the SEC with-
out warning had changed its policy so as to treat the com-
plainant differently from others in similar circumstances, 
Judge Wyzanski said: 'Flexibility was not the least of the 
objectives sought by Congress in selecting administrative 
rather than judicial determination of the problems of security 
regulation .... 'l'he administrator is expected to treat expe-
rience not as a jailer but as a teacher.' Chief Justice Vinson, 
speaking for a Court of Appeals, once declared: 'In the 
instant case, it seems to us there has been a departure from 
the policy of the Commission expressed in the decided cases, 
but this is not a controlling factor upon the Commission.' 
Other similar authority is rather abundant. Possibly the 
outstanding decision the other way, unless the dissenting opin-
ion in tlJe second Chenery case is regarded as authority, is 
NLRB v. Mall rrool Co. [119 F.2d 700.) The Board in order-
ing back pay for employees wrongfully discharged had in the 
court's opinion departed from its usual rule of ordering back 
pay only from time of filing charges, when filing of charges 
is unreasonably delayed and no mitigating circumstances are 
shown. 'l'he Court, assuming unto itself the Board's power 
to find facts, said: 'We find in the record no mitigating cir-
cumstances justifying the delay.' 'fhen it modified the order 
on the ground that 'Consistency in administrative rulings is 
essential, for to adopt different standards for similar situa-
tions is to act arbitrarily.' From the standpoint of an ideal 
system, one can hardly disagree with the court's remark. But 
from the standpoint of a workable system, perhaps the courts 
should not impose upon the agencies standards of consistency 
of action which the courts themselves customarily violate. 
Probably deliberate change in or deviation from established 
administrative policy should be permitted so long as the action 
is not arbitrary or unreasonable. This is the view of most 
courts." (Davis, Administrative Law, § 168; see also Parker, 
Administrative Law, pp. 250-253; 73 C.J.S., Public Adminis-
trative Bodies and Procedure, § 148; California Emp. Com. v. 
Black-Foxe M. Inst., 43 Cal.App.2d Supp. 868 [110 P.2d 
729].) Here the board was not acting arbitrarily if it did 
change its position because it may have concluded that another 
license would be too many in the vicinity of the school. k: 
[7] The contention is also advanced that the neighborhood 
is predominantly Jewish and plaintiffs intend to sell wine 
to customers of the Jewish faith for sacramental purposes. We 
fail to see how that has any bearing on the issue. The wine 
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to be sold is an intoxieating beverage, the sale of which requires 
a license under the law. Purthermore, it cannot be said that 
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained else-
where. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22045. In Bank. Apr. 29, 1953.] 
ILSE LAHN WEI'l'ZENKORN, Appellant, v. SOL LESSER 
et al., Respondents. 
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint 
which alleges that plaintiff wrote and was exclusive owner 
of a literary composition, that she had submitted it to de-
fendants at their special request "pursuant to an express oral 
understanding and agreement" that, in consideration of such 
submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof 
and given the customary screen credit as author if they should 
use all or any part of it, that defendants accepted submission 
of the document and retained it in their possession for sev-
eral months, and that thereafter they produced and exhibited 
a motion picture which was patterned on, copied and used 
plaintiff's composition to her damage, states a cause of action, 
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining 
a demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed 
with directions to permit defendants to answer. 
[2a, 2b] ld.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that 
plaintiffs furnished to defendants, at their special instance and 
request, her literary composition for the purpose of sale to 
defendants on payment to her of a reasonable value thereof, 
and that defendants accepted such literary composition, re-
tained and used it to her damage, states a cause of action, 
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a 
demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed with 
directions to permit defendants to answer. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Prop-
erty and Copyright, § 112. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Literary Property. 
